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A Game Theoretic Approach to Decision Making
for Multiple Vehicles at Roundabout
Sasinee Pruekprasert1, Jérémy Dubut1,2, Xiaoyi Zhang1, Chao Huang1 and Masako Kishida1
Abstract—In this paper, we consider a problem of decision
making for multiple autonomous vehicles in a roundabout. In
particular, we propose an approach that balances between the
safety of all vehicles and their velocity, using a Nash equilibrium
to make a decision. Numerical simulations are included to
illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
I. Introduction
The demand for safety, energy saving, environmental pro-
tection, and comfortable transportation services has been
increasing. Thus, it is a global consensus to accelerate the de-
velopment of autonomous vehicles, which incorporate many
advanced technologies such as smart sensors and wireless
vehicle-to-vehicle communication. For this reason, govern-
ments around the world have begun to develop strategies
to address the challenges that arise from the autonomous
driving [1]. One challenge is ensuring safety and reliability of
autonomous driving systems, which is a social and economic
problem. The importance of solving this challenge will
increase as the degree of automation, and the number of
such systems will grow by several magnitudes in the coming
future [2], [3].
Roundabouts are often used to improve traffic safety in
urban areas. According to different studies, the replacement
of signalised intersections by roundabouts reduces injury
crashes by 75% [4], [5], and is more suited to where traffic
volume is low [6]. From a decision making point of view,
they are similar to unsignalised intersections, as they require
drivers to decide when to enter, depending on the other
vehicles, and influencing the behaviours of the other vehicles.
Although roundabouts are safer than traditional signalised
intersections for human drivers, there are still issues to
enforce safety for autonomous vehicles. The inner island of
the roundabout limits the ability of autonomous vehicles to
predict traffic patterns and may lead to a traffic collision.
Therefore, critical decision making is the key to collision-
free driving in roundabouts. A few game theoretic approaches
have shed light on these aspects [7].
In game theoretic approaches, the agents (vehicles) decide
their actions by optimising their profit (here, safety and
speed) in response to actions of others. This was already
observed in the domain of autonomous driving, to model
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the flow of vehicles in a road with lane change [8], and
decision making at unsignalised intersections [9], [10], [11],
and roundabouts [12], [13]. In [12], the authors proposed
a cooperative strategy in conflict situations between two
autonomous vehicles in a roundabout using non-zero-sum
games. Each autonomous vehicle tries to shorten its waiting
time by analysing possible actions and influences of other
vehicles on the game outcome. In [13], the authors proposed
to use k-level games for two autonomous vehicles to decide
their directions and accelerations.
In this paper, we propose an approach to decision making
for several autonomous vehicles in a roundabout. The pro-
posed approach optimises the safety and velocity of vehicles
based on Nash equilibria, more specifically by backward
induction. This allows a vehicle to decide its control input,
using their predictions of other vehicles’ behaviours.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We first set
up the problem in Section II. After describing the flow of
our decision making approach in Section III, we focus on the
steps that compute the control input and the predictions of
the other vehicles’ behaviours using game theory in Section
IV. In Section V, a set of simulations are carried out to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. The
section VI concludes the paper.
II. Problem formulation
A. Vehicles in roundabout
This paper considers the decision making of autonomous
vehicles at a single-lane w-way unsignalised roundabout
intersection. It is assumed that entrances and exits of the
roundabout is right-hand traffic and the traffic flows counter-
clockwise in the roundabout. A vehicle may enter the round-
about at any entrance and exit at any exit way, but is not
allowed to drive backward. The decision making is based
on vehicles in the roundabout and those approaching the
roundabout, but independent of those already exited the
roundabout.
B. Vehicle configurations
In order to focus on the high-level decision making for the
autonomous vehicles, this paper does not consider the path
trackers and the low-level control layer, which controls the
engine to follow a precomputed navigation path (see Fig. 1).
For this reason, we consider point-mass vehicle model and
assume that the vehicles perfectly follow the given navigation
path.
This leaves the only control input for each vehicle i at
a time step being its acceleration ai(t) along the given
Fig. 1. Motion planning architecture [14], [15] and position of this work.
navigation path. To simplify the problem, we also assume
that each vehicle i chooses an acceleration ai(t) from a finite
set at each time step t, so as to minimise their cost functions.
Let
Xi(t) = [ri(t), θi(t), vi(t), ai(t),mani(t)]> (1)
represent the configuration of the vehicle i at time step t ∈ N,
where (ri(t), θi(t)) is the position of the vehicle i in polar
coordinates, vi(t) is its velocity, ai(t) is its acceleration, and
mani(t) ∈ {“enter” , “inside” , “exit”} is its manoeuvre, at
time step t, respectively. Then, the time-evolution of the
configuration of each vehicle i can be represented by
Xi(t + 1) = Fi(Xi(t), ai(t)), (2)
where the function Fi returns the configuration of the vehicle
i after one time step, assuming that ai(t) is constant between
the time steps t and t + 1.
C. Balancing safety and aggressiveness
The cost functions used to determine ai(t) balance between
two features; safety and velocity. The safety feature is small
when the distance with other vehicle is large, while the
velocity feature is small when the vehicle’s velocity is close
to the maximal legal velocity. The balance is determined by
the weight vector
Wi = [wsi , wai ], wsi + wai = 1, (3)
where wsi ≥ 0 is the weight of the safety feature and wai ≥ 0
is the weight of the velocity feature. This weight vector indi-
cates how much the vehicle i values velocity over safety: the
higher wai is (and so, the lower w
s
i is), the more aggressive
the vehicle will be (and so, the less conservative). Thus, this
weight vector determines the aggressiveness, which plays an
important role in the decision making.
III. Outline of the decision making
This section provides an overview of our approach to
decision making summarised below as well as in Figure 2.
First, each vehicle initialises the configuration and the
aggressiveness for each other vehicle nearby (Section III-A).
Then at each time step, each vehicle repeats the followings:
Fig. 2. Outline of the decision making.
1) Decide the acceleration, by predicting the neighbours’
behaviour and minimising its own cost (Sections IV-B
and IV-C). This step is the main contribution of the
paper.
2) Based on the choice of acceleration and predicted
neighbours’ behaviour, predict the next configurations
(Section III-B).
3) Observe the next configurations (Section III-A).
4) Compare its observations and predictions, and update
the predicted aggressiveness values of the vehicles
nearby (Section IV-D).
A. Observations and initialisation
In the roundabout, each vehicle may not be able to observe
all the vehicles, but may observe only the vehicles nearby.
Let Ni(t) ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} be the set of vehicles that are being
observed by vehicle i at time step t. We assume that i ∈
Ni(t), that is, i can observe itself. In our simulations, Ni(t)
is given by the vehicle i itself, the closest two vehicles in
front, and the closest vehicle behind, if they are not too far.
The observed configuration of the roundabout for the vehicle
i at time t is then given by the vector X˜i(t) = [Xj(t)]>j∈Ni (t)
of individual configurations (1).
At each time step t, each vehicle i observes its nearby
configuration X˜i(t) and computes ŵai, j(t + 1) ∈ [0, 1], which
is i’s prediction for the aggressiveness waj of j ∈ Ni(t) (to
be discussed in Section IV-D). The weight vector Ŵi, j(t) of
the vehicle j, predicted by i at time t, is then given by [1 −
ŵai, j(t), ŵai, j]. For initialisation, let Ŵi, j(0) = [0.5, 0.5] for all
j ∈ Ni(0) \ {i} and Ŵi,i(0) = Wi .
B. Prediction of the next configuration
Recall that the navigation path generator of each vehicle
i provides the function Fi , which computes the next config-
uration of the vehicle i from its current configuration and
a given acceleration a (see Section II-B). Let us consider
a given vector of accelerations a = [aj(t; s)]j∈Ni (t), 0≤s<h
of vehicles in Ni(t), for the time horizon from s = 0 to
s = h − 1. Namely, aj(t; s) is a given acceleration of the
vehicle j ∈ Ni(t) at the time step t + s. We use X̂i, j(t, a; s)
for denoting the configuration of the vehicle j ∈ Ni(t) at time
t+s predicted by the vehicle i, based on the observation X˜i(t)
at time t and the vector of accelerations a.
To compute X̂i, j(t, a; s) at s > 0, the vehicle i cannot
simply use the function Fj as the vehicle i does not know
which path the vehicle j will follow. For example, i does not
know which exit j will use. Therefore, the vehicle i predicts
a function F̂i, j[t] using its own function Fi and the observed
manoeuvre manj(t). If manj(t) is “exit”, then i knows that
j will use the next exit. If manj(t) is “enter” or “inside”, i
computes the navigation path as if the vehicle j stays inside
the roundabout indefinitely, possibly turning around several
times. We always have F̂i,i[t] = Fi at each time t as i knows
its own navigation path. Then, we define the predicted next
configurations X̂i, j(t, a; s) as follows.
• The predicted configuration at time t is given by the
observations:
X̂i, j(t, a; 0) = Xj(t). (4)
• The prediction at time t+s+1 is computed by assuming
that the vehicle j will follow the navigation path given
by F̂i, j[t], from the predicted configuration at time t+ s,
with constant acceleration aj(t; s):
X̂i, j(t, a; s + 1) = F̂i, j[t](X̂i, j(t, a; s), aj(t; s)). (5)
IV. Control inputs and predictions, as Nash equilibria
This section is the main contribution of the paper, where
we propose a game-theoretic decision making approach to
the problem. Since the autonomous vehicles select an accel-
eration that minimises their costs, the decision making can be
naturally viewed as an n-player non-cooperative game played
between the vehicles. Using the concept of aggressiveness,
the decision making can be formulated as a finite perfect-
information game.
A. n-player game with perfect information
Let us first briefly review the basic game theory that we
use. For details about game theory, see usual textbooks,
e.g. [16].
We consider a game G = (P, Γ, (H1, . . . ,Hn)), where
P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} is the set of players (representing the n
vehicles), Γ is a finite set of strategies of the players (given
by acceleration patterns, Section IV-C) and Hi : Γn → R+
is a cost function (given by safety and velocity, Section IV-
B). Each player pi plays the game by selecting her strategy
γi from the set Γ, which determines her control input at
the current time step. Then, the cost for pi is given by
Hi(γ1, . . . , γn). All players aim to minimise their own costs.
Let G be a game with complete information, i.e., all players
know the sets P and Γ, and all functions H1, . . . ,Hn.
A strategy profile (γ1, . . . , γn) is called a best response
of player i if Hi(γ1, . . . , γi, . . . , γn) ≤ Hi(γ1, . . . , γ′i, . . . , γn)
for all γ′i ∈ Γi . The strategy profile is also called a Nash
equilibrium if it is a best response of all players. In other
words, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no
player can reduce her cost by changing her strategy, provided
that all other players do not change theirs.
G is a 1-round sequential game if there is a total order ≺
defined on P, such that the players take turns selecting their
Fig. 3. An extensive-form of a sequential game played between p1 and
p2, where the set of strategies is Γ = {γa, γb }.
strategies according to this order – meaning that if pi ≺ pj
then pj selects her strategy before pi – and the game stops
after all players have selected their strategies. A sequential
game G is a game with perfect information if each player
remembers the history of all strategies played before her.
The extensive-form of a 1-round sequential game with
perfect and complete information can be described as a finite
decision tree. Fig. 3 shows an extensive-form of such a game
played between two players. As we assume that p2 ≺ p1, p1
selects her strategy before p2 at the root of the tree. A Nash
equilibrium of the game can be obtain by applying backward
induction algorithm on the decision tree. For the game in
Fig. 3, a Nash equilibrium can be obtained as following.
First, we compute the best responses for p2 in both subtrees,
which represent the cases that p1 selects γa and γb . We then
compute the best response for p1 by considering the best
responses of p2 for the subtrees. In this case, (γa, γb) is a
Nash equilibrium.
B. Cost functions
Here, we develop the cost function to be minimised in the
decision game. For the whole Section IV-B, we consider X to
be a vector of configurations (either observed or predicted),
N indicating a subsets of vehicles (this could be Ni(t), but
not necessarily), Φi = [φsafei , φveloi ]> to be the feature vector
for safety and velocity objectives for the vehicle i, and W =
[ws, wa] to be a weight vector (typically, the weight vector
Wi from Section II-C or given by some predictions Ŵj,i(t)
from Section IV-D).
1) Cost at each time step: We first introduce the cost of
a vehicle at each time step, which we call the step-cost. The
step-cost of the vehicle i is given by
Si(X,N,W) = W · Φi(X,N). (6)
2) Safety: In order to evaluate the safety, each vehicle
i considers the nearest vehicle in front of and the nearest
behind within a given distance D along the navigation path
(if they exist). Concretely, we consider the pair of vehicles
( f ∗, b∗) ∈ F × B where
f ∗ = argmin
f
{θ f−θi | f ∈ N\{i}, 0 ≤ θ f−θi ≤ pi, d( f , i) < D},
b∗ = argmin
b
{θi−θb | b ∈ N\{i}, 0 < θi−θb < pi, d(i, b) < D},
where θ j is the angular position of vehicle j and d(i, j) is
the distance between the vehicles i and j measured along the
navigation path.
Then, we define the safety feature φsafei by:
φ
safe
i (X,N) = φfi (X,N) + φbi (X,N), (7)
where the features φki , k ∈ { f , b} are defined by:
φki (X,N) =

Ec,en + βki (X,N) if d(k, i) ∈ [Dc,en,D∞)
and mani = enter,
and mank , enter,
Ec + βki (X,N) if d(k, i) ∈ [Dc,D∞)
E∞ + C∞.(D − d(k, i))2 if D∞ ≤ d(k, i),
βki (X,N) otherwise.
(8)
with
βki (X,N) =

0 if k∗ does not exist,
Cin,k · (D − d(k, i))2 if mank = enter,
and mani , enter,
Cen,k · (D − d(k, i))2 if mank , enter,
and mani = enter,
C · (D − d(k, i))2 otherwise.
(9)
where Cin,k < C < Cen,k , C∞, Ec < Ec,en  E∞, D∞ <
Dc < Dc,en are given constants. In (8), φ fi (resp. φ
b
i ) is the
cost induced by the nearest vehicle in front of i (resp. behind
i). All the cases depend on the manoeuvres of f (resp. b)
and i. The equations in (9) reflect the fact that, when we
are inside the roundabout (the second case), we do not have
to care much about the vehicles not entered yet, as we have
priority. On the other hand, we have to be extra careful when
we are entering the roundabout, as we do not have priority
(the third case). The intention of the equation (8) is that
a vehicle has to be extra careful when it is close to other
vehicles.
3) Velocity: Let vl be the speed limit of the road. The
velocity feature is given by
φveloi (X,N) =

Cen · (vl − vi)2 if vl ≥ v and mani = enter
Cin · (vl − vi)2 if vl ≥ v and mani , enter
Co · (vl − vi)2 otherwise
(10)
where Cin, Cen (resp Co) are constant positive coefficients for
the cases that vi is under (resp. over) the speed limit. The
intention is that Co is much bigger than Cin and Cen, because
we cannot allow a vehicle to break the law.
4) Accumulated cost function: We construct the accu-
mulated cost based on the receding horizon control ap-
proach [17], which determines the control inputs of the
vehicles, based on the predicted future up to a horizon
time step h < ∞. Given a vector a = [aj(s)]j∈N, 0≤s<h
of accelerations (typically, given by a strategy profile, see
Section IV-C), the accumulated cost function of the vehicle
j, predicted by the vehicle i at time t is:
K̂i, j(t, X,N,W, a) =
h−1∑
s=0
λs · Sj(X¯(t; s),N,W), (11)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed discount factor and X¯(t; s) is
defined by induction:
• X¯(t; 0) = X ,
• X¯(t; s + 1) = [F̂i, j[t](X¯(t; s), aj(s))]j∈N . Recall that
F̂i, j[t] provides the navigation path of j, predicted by
i at time t (see Section III-B).
In particular, for j ∈ Ni(t), K̂i, j(t, X˜i(t),Ni(t),W, a) is given
by:
h−1∑
s=0
λs · Sj([X̂i, j(t, a; s)]j∈Ni (t),Ni(t),W). (12)
Remark that, to predict the accumulated cost of the vehicle
j, the vehicle i uses its own observations, in particular, its
own Ni(t). Let us consider the case where j is the nearest
vehicle in front of i. There are two situations, depending on
whether i can observe its second nearest vehicle in front.
If it can, then this vehicle will be in Ni(t), and then will
be considered as the nearest vehicle in front of j in the
computation of K̂i, j . If it cannot, this means that this vehicle
is far from i, and i will compute K̂i, j , as if there was no
vehicle in front of j.
C. Decision making
As introduced in Section IV-A, we employ n-player game
to decide the acceleration at each time step. Each vehicle i
determines ai(t) at time t using the Nash equilibrium of the
following game Gi(t):
1) The set of players is the set of nearby vehicles Ni(t).
2) The set of strategies is the set of acceleration patterns.
More precisely, given a time horizon h < ∞, the set Γ
of acceleration patterns is then a finite subset of Rh .
3) Given a strategy profile a = [aj(s)]j∈Ni (t), 0≤s<h ∈
Γ |Ni (t) | , the cost of the vehicle j ∈ Ni(t) is given by:
Hj(a) = K̂i, j(t, X˜i(t),Ni(t), Ŵi, j(t), a) (13)
that is, the accumulated cost of the vehicle j, predicted
by the vehicle i. Here Ŵi, j(t) is the weight vector of
vehicle j, predicted by vehicle i. (Recall that this vector
was initialised in Section III-A, and we will describe
in Section IV-D how to update it.)
4) The sequential game is constructed by ordering vehi-
cles in Ni(t) according to their aggressiveness value,
namely, let any total order ≺ on Ni(t) such that if
ŵai, j(t) < ŵai,k(t) then j ≺ k. This means that the more
aggressive a vehicle is, the more priority it will have
to choose its control input (i.e., its acceleration).
To compute a Nash equilibrium of this game, we use a
backward induction from Section IV-A. Namely, a strategy
profile is given by a vector a = [aj(s)]j∈Ni (t), 0≤s<h ∈ Γ |Ni (t) |
of accelerations, which also includes ai(t). The predicted
configurations for the next h steps are computed as in Section
III-B.
D. Updates the prediction of the aggressiveness
1) Updates in a normal situation: In this section, we
consider a situation where at least one vehicle from Ni(t)
has a strictly positive velocity.
At each time step t, let Ui(t) ⊆ Ni(t) \ {i} be the set of
vehicles whose observed configurations Xj(t+1) "differs too
much" from the configuration X̂i, j(t, a; 1) of the vehicle j at
time t + 1, predicted by the vehicle i at time t. For such a
vehicle j ∈ Ui(t), the vehicle i updates the aggressiveness
ŵai, j(t) to a value that describes the behaviour of the vehicle
j more accurately. Then, vehicle i uses backward induction
on several games involving i and j, each game for a wa
ranging in a given set W. More precisely, i considers each
game Gi, j(t; wa) defined exactly as Gi(t) in Section IV-C, but
replaces Ni(t) by {i, j} (to reduce the computation time) and
Ŵi, j(t) by W = [1 − wa, wa]. Using a backward induction
on Gi, j(t; wa) (as in Section IV-C), i computes a strategy
profile and predicts the acceleration of j at time t +1, which
we denote by âj(t + 1; wa). Let ŵai, j(t + 1) be the value wa
for which âj(t+1; wa) fits the observed acceleration aj(t+1)
the most closely, that is:
ŵai, j(t + 1) = arg min
wa ∈W
|âj(t + 1; wa) − aj(t + 1)| (14)
Vehicle i then update the predicted weight vector by
Ŵi, j(t + 1) = [1 − ŵai, j(t + 1), ŵai, j(t + 1)]. (15)
Otherwise, if the predicted configuration is close enough
to the real configuration (i.e., j < Ui(t)), then Ŵi, j(t + 1) =
Ŵi, j(t) and Ŵi,i(t + 1) = Wi .
2) Updates in a deadlock situation: In this section, we
consider the situation where all vehicles in Ni(t) stop, that
is, have zero velocity. This situation is particularly important,
as it may induce a deadlock: every vehicle is waiting for the
other vehicles to move.
In this case, we want the vehicle i to make a move, as
long as it is not in a critical situation. If the vehicle i is not
in such a critical situation, we enforce it to make a move by
increasing its own aggressiveness. More precisely, we define:
Ŵi,i(t+1) = [max{0, ŵsi,i(t)−0.5},min{1, ŵai,i(t)+0.5}] (16)
and we fix Ŵi, j(t + 1) = Ŵi, j(t) for j ∈ Ni(t) \ {i}.
V. Experimental results
A. Simulation setup
This section presents simulation results to demonstrate the
performance of our decision making. The roundabout and the
navigation paths used in the simulation, presented in Fig.
4, are designed based on practical situations [18]. All the
vehicles drive on the right-hand side of the road and get into
the roundabout using one of the four entrances. We consider
four types of navigation paths: to turn right (blue dashed
line), to go straight (black dashed line), to turn left (red
dashed line), and to make a U-turn (green dashed line).
We perform simulations by considering up to five vehi-
cles, whose navigation paths are determined randomly. For
the two-vehicle case, the entrance way of each vehicle is
Fig. 4. The navigation paths in the roundabout.
randomised. For the five-vehicle case, one vehicle is placed
inside the roundabout at the beginning of the simulation. The
initial velocities of the vehicles entering (resp. placed inside)
the roundabout is randomly selected from [0, vl/2] (resp.
[0, vl]), where vl = 11 m/s is the speed limit of the road [5].
The weight wai of each vehicle i is randomly selected from{0.2, . . . , 0.8}.
The decision making is performed every 0.3s. The obser-
vation set Ni(t) consists of the vehicle i itself, the closest two
vehicles in front of i and the closest vehicle behind i, if they
are within pi radians. For the parameters, we use λ = 0.8,
D = 15.5pim, Cin, f = 2, Cin,b = 1, C = 3, Cen, f = 6,
Cen,b = 7, C∞ = E∞ = 10200, Ec = 1025, Ec,en = 1035,
Dc,en = 13, Dc,in = 10, D∞ = 7 Cen = 15, Cin = 0.3, and
Co = 1015.
We use the following patterns of acceleration/deceleration
sequences with a time horizon h = 4:
• [−50,−50,−50,−50] for a strong break (typically needed
for an urgent break),
• [−20,−20, 0, 0] for a small break,
• [0, 0, 0, 0] for no acceleration,
• [5, 5, 0, 0] for a small short acceleration,
• [5, 5, 5, 5] for a constant small acceleration,
• [20, 0, 0, 0] for a strong short acceleration (typically
needed when the vehicle has low velocity before en-
tering the roundabout).
To update the prediction of the aggressiveness (see Section
IV-D), a vehicle i updates it’s predicted weight ŵai, j if the
distance between the observed and the predicted positions of
the vehicle j is bigger than 2m. We useW = {0.1, . . . , 0.9},
although the velocity feature of each vehicle j is initialised
within the range {0.2, . . . , 0.8}. This is to allow the vehicle
i to determine whether ŵai,i < ŵ
a
i, j or ŵ
a
i,i > ŵ
a
i, j , so that it
can predict the total order ≺ (see Section IV-C). A vehicle
is considered to be in a critical situation if it is waiting to
enter the roundabout, but observes a vehicle that is already
inside the roundabout.
We perform 500 simulations for each case. We consider
that a collision occurs if we detected two vehicles within
4.5m. All the programs were coded and run using Matlab
2018a and 2018b.
TABLE I
Simulation Results
No. of Vehicles Collision Rate(%) Ave. Minimal Distances Ave. Total Steps
5 4.2 10.5 107.44
4 2.4 10.4 91.29
3 0 14.2 73.76
2 0 28.5 41.98
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. A dangerous situation at different time steps.
B. Results and analysis
The simulation results are presented in Table I. Columns
1-4 respectively represent the number of vehicles involved in
each instance, the collision percentage, the average minimum
distances between two vehicles, and the average maximum
time step that a vehicles spent in the roundabout.
For the safety feature, we evaluate our simulations by
considering the collision rates and the average minimum
distance. For two and three vehicles cases, all our simulations
(500 each) have ended with no collision and with all vehicles
reaching their exits following their navigation paths. For four
and five vehicles cases, some collisions were detected (12 and
21 out of 500 simulations respectively).
Another important aspect of our proposed approach is to
optimise the velocity and, consequently, the time spent in the
roundabout. In average, this is 12.6s (41.98 steps of 0.3s) for
the two-vehicle case, while it becomes 32.2s (107.44 steps)
for the five-vehicle case.
Fig. 5 illustrates a dangerous situation when two vehicles,
blue and green ones, are getting very close to each other.
In Fig. 5(a), the green vehicle brakes and waits for the
black vehicle to enter the roundabout. In Fig. 5(b), the blue
vehicle approaches the green vehicle while expecting the
green vehicle to move forward. Both vehicles make rational
decisions in this situation. As shown in Fig. 5(c), the blue
vehicle brakes and the green vehicle accelerates. Then, the
blue vehicle accelerates again after the distance between the
two vehicles is large enough. This instance shows that the
vehicles can make rational decisions to avoid the potential
rear-end collision.
VI. Conclusion
We propose an approach to decision making for multiple
autonomous vehicles in a roundabout. Our approach balances
between the safety and the velocity feature of the vehicles.
Using the proposed concept of vehicles’ aggressiveness, we
formulate the interactions between the vehicles as finite
sequential games. The decision making is based on Nash
equilibria of these sequential games, which are computed
using backward induction. We demonstrate the performance
of our approach by performing numerical simulations, show-
ing feasibility and the balance between safety (collision rate,
minimum distance) and velocity (average time spent in the
roundabout) optimisations. For future works, we will improve
our the proposed approach by isolating the scenarios leading
to collisions. We will also provide some guarantees that no
collisions can occur under some reasonable assumptions of
the initial conditions.
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